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The	new	sovereigntism:	what	it	means	for	human
rights	law	in	the	UK
Brexit	relates	to	a	new	sovereigntism	that	has	alarming	implications	for	the	rule	of	law,	argues
Fiona	de	Londras	(University	of	Birmingham).	Although	the	European	Convention	on
Human	Rights	is	not	an	EU	law	–	and	therefore	unaffected	by	leaving	–	there	are	striking
parallels	between	pro-Brexit	and	anti-ECHR	arguments.	The	prisoner	voting	saga	is	one	area
where	Westminster	has	decided	national	sovereignty	should	trump	European	human	rights
law.	The	row	over	whether	armed	forces	must	always	comply	with	the	Convention	is	another.
For	many	people,	Brexit	is	about	taking	back	‘control’;	about	determining	for	‘ourselves’	what	the	law	is,	how	it
applies,	how	we	spend	our	money,	and	how	we	develop	our	policies.	The	fact	that	many	people	both	before	the
referendum	and	now	struggle	to	identify	with	accuracy	an	area	of	law	or	policy	in	which	the	EU	has	‘taken’	control
(and	not	had	competence	ceded	or	shared	through	a	Treaty	change	ratified	by	the	UK)	is	irrelevant;	what	matters
is	the	perception	of	a	lack	of	national	autonomy,	and	an	associated	corrosion	of	domestic	democratic	control.
Deep	within	at	least	parts	of	the	arguments	that	circulate	around	Brexit	is	a	form	of	new	sovereigntism	that	is
deeply	worrying	to	the	rule	of	law.	The	UK	is	hardly	alone	in	this	phenomenon;	as	far	back	as	2000	Peter	Spiro
wrote	about	the	emergence	of	new	sovereigntism	in	the	United	States;	about	a	group	of	scholars	and	intellectuals
who	were	not	opposed	to	international	law	per	se,	but	who	thought	that	the	US	should	be	able	to	engage	with	it
as	and	when	it	wanted	to.	In	other	words,	these	scholars	promoted	an	a	la	carte	approach	to	international	law,
underpinned	by	a	“brand	of	anti-internationalism	[that]	runs	deep	in	the	American	political	tradition”.
‘The	Emperor	of	the	Gulls	in	his	stolen	gear’:	George	III	inspects	Napoleon	as	he	parades	in	a
huge	crown	topped	with	a	poisoned	chalice.	Attributed	to	C	Williams,	1804.	Image:	Digital
Bodleian	via	a	CC-BY-NC-SA	3.0	licence
New	sovereigntism	will	inevitably	look	a	little	different	here	in	the	United	Kingdom,	but	its	basic	argument	is	the
same:	the	UK	is	sovereign,	and	therefore	can	decide	for	itself	what	international	law	to	follow	and	what	to	resist,
as	and	when	it	best	serves	its	purpose.
Current	debates	about	the	relationship	with	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	and	about	the	obligation	to
comply	with	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	that	it	enforces,	are	exemplary	of	this.	The	ECHR	is	not
an	EU	law,	and	Brexit	will	not	mean	anything	for	the	UK’s	international	legal	obligations	vis-à-vis	the	Convention,
but	the	parallels	in	the	basic	strands	of	argument	around	both	are	striking.
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Ed	Bates	notes	that	when	the	UK	signed	up	the	ECHR	it	did	so	fully	in	the	expectation	that	it	would	rarely	if	ever
find	itself	in	contravention	thereof.	In	this,	it	was	hardly	alone;	few	states	that	signed	up	to	this	Convention
anticipated	either	how	it	would	develop	over	time,	or	that	they	would	find	themselves	at	the	receiving	end	of
critical	judgments	from	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights.	However,	inevitably,	over	the	decades	of	its
operation	the	Convention	has	evolved;	it	has	been	developed	into	a	significant	international	treaty,	with
substantial	enforcement	mechanisms,	and	with	a	Court	that	has	the	legal	power	to	hand	down	binding	judgments
on	states.
Since	the	enactment	of	the	Human	Rights	Act	1998,	the	Convention’s	international	legal	character	has	been
matched	by	its	growing	domestic	legal	importance.	Courts	in	this	country	can	now	take	into	account	the
judgments	of	the	ECtHR	in	interpreting	UK	law,	and	can	even	signify	to	Westminster	that	an	Act	of	Parliament	is
incompatible	with	the	Convention.	The	expectation	then	is	that	the	law	will	be	changed	to	secure	compatibility,	but
of	course	the	courts	here	cannot	invalidate	Acts	of	Parliament—to	do	so	would	be	to	jettison	almost	completely
the	parliamentary	sovereignty	on	which	much	of	UK	constitutional	law	is	built.	Neither	can	the	European	Court	of
Human	Rights	really	force	the	UK	to	comply	with	its	judgments;	it	relies	on	political	pressure	from	other	states	in
the	Council	of	Europe	to	secure	such	compliance,	as	well	as	on	the	sense	within	the	respondent	states
themselves	that	such	judgments	should	be	implemented	even	if	they	disagree	with	the	outcome.
That	is	at	the	heart	of	the	rule	of	law:	that	law	is	law	and	must	be	complied	with,	and	that	one’s	position	of	power
cannot	exempt	one	from	the	application	of	the	law.	Applied	in	the	broader	context	of	the	European	Convention	on
Human	Rights,	this	means	that	the	Convention	is	law,	that	the	judgments	of	the	Strasbourg	Court	must	be
complied	with,	and	that	the	fact	that	the	UK	has	the	power	not	to	comply	with	them	(by,	for	example,	simply	not
changing	its	law	to	be	compatible	with	the	Convention)	does	not	mean	that	it	may	resist	those	judgments.
Increasingly,	however,	there	are	signs	of	a	new	sovereigntist	resistance	to	those	basic	principles.
Take,	for	example,	the	prisoner	voting	saga.	For	over	a	decade	now,	judgments	of	the	European	Court	of	Human
Rights	requiring	the	UK	to	adjust	its	law	so	that	there	would	be	no	blanket	ban	on	prisoners	voting	(although
some	limitations	would	be	permitted)	have	been	resisted.	The	reason,	simply	put,	is	that	Westminster	has	already
decided	that	prisoners	should	not	be	allowed	to	vote,	and	that	this	decision	has	a	kind	of	superior	force	to	the
decision	of	the	Strasbourg	Court.	There	are	good	political	reasons	why	someone	might	agree	with	that.	One
might	think	that	Westminster	is	democratic	and	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	is	not,	so	that	Westminster’s
decision	should	prevail,	for	example.	But	when	translated	into	an	argument	about	law	that	makes	little	sense:	the
United	Kingdom	is	legally	obliged	to	comply	with	international	law,	it	is	a	party	to	the	Convention,	there	is	a
judgment	against	it,	that	judgment	is	binding,	and	therefore	the	UK	must	comply	whether	it	agrees	with	the
outcome	or	not.	That	is	what	differentiates	law	from	politics,	after	all;	that	is	the	essence	of	the	rule	of	law.
I	have	previously	characterised	the	refusal	to	execute	these	prisoner	voting	judgments	(and	similar	refusals	in
other	states)	as	a	form	of	principled	resistance;	a	political	problem,	that	cannot	be	resolved	using	legal	means.
This	should	not	be	taken	as	under-estimating	the	scale	of	the	problem	that	this	points	to.	The	political	challenge
here	is	severe	for	it	is,	at	its	core,	a	challenge	to	the	basic	idea	that	international	law	is	law	and	the	obligation	to
comply	with	it	is	real;	that	it	cannot	be	disregarded	on	the	basis	of	political	disagreement.	The	new	sovereigntist
argument	that	suggests	otherwise—that	maintains	that	as	long	as	the	disagreement	is	underpinned	by	a	political
process	at	the	national	level	such	resistance	is	justifiable—is	fundamentally	an	argument	that	rejects	the	nature	of
international	law	as	law,	and	the	rule	of	law	as	a	principle	that	has	application	in	the	international	sphere.	Those
are	exactly	the	kinds	of	arguments	that	underpin	‘take	back	control’	tropes,	which	have	potent	popular	and
political	impact.
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The	next	site	of	contestation	between	Westminster	and	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	is	already	being
marked	out.	Increasingly	there	is	a	sense	in	the	UK	that	the	ECHR	should	not	apply	to	British	troops	operating
abroad:	that	it	should	not	be	possible	to	hold	those	forces	to	account	for	human	rights	abuses	undertaken	in
overseas	operations.	The	ECtHR	has	a	clearly	different	view:	if	the	military	forces	of	an	ECHR	state	are	in
effective	control	of	a	territory	or	a	person	they	must	comply	with	the	Convention,	even	if	they	are	acting	overseas.
For	some,	such	as	the	Prime	Minister,	this	leads	to	“activist	left	wing	human	rights	lawyers	harangue[ing]	and
harass[ing]	the	bravest	of	the	brave”.	For	others,	it	leads	to	accountability,	not	only	for	the	actions	of	the	armed
forces	but	also	for	members	of	those	armed	forces	who	are	entitled	to	the	protection	of	the	ECHR	while	acting
abroad.	The	government’s	plan	is	to	derogate	from	the	Convention	in	all	future	armed	conflicts,	but	ministers
know	as	well	as	human	rights	lawyers	do	that	derogations	are	only	permitted	in	limited	circumstances,	and	that
any	attempt	at	blanket	future	derogations	in	overseas	operations	may	well	fail	and	lead	to	judgments	against	the
UK.	One	can	already	foresee	how	this	would	be	presented	as	yet	another	example	of	the	shifting	of	power
properly	held	by	Westminster	(and	Whitehall)	to	European	institutions;	how	it	would	underpin	the	further	argument
that	international	law	has	exceeded	its	proper	boundaries,	that	European	courts	are	exceeding	their	proper	roles,
and	that	the	UK	can	and	should	simply	ignore	such	judgments	or,	ultimately,	withdraw	from	the	Convention	and
‘take	back	control’.
Brexit	is	a	very	different	prospect	to	withdrawal	from	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights,	but	the
arguments	that	underpin	and	surround	the	relationship	between	the	UK	and	both	the	EU	and	the	ECHR	are
strikingly	similar.	They	are	arguments	of	control,	of	resistance	to	the	authority	of	international	law,	and	of	the
resistability	of	judicial	determinations.	These	new	sovereigntist	arguments	have	a	powerful	political	and	popular
pull,	but	a	potentially	dangerous	reach	into	the	rule	of	law.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	
Fiona	de	Londras	is	Professor	of	Global	Legal	Studies	at	Birmingham	Law	School,	University	of	Birmingham.	Her
next	book,	Great	Debates	on	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	(with	Dzehtsiarou),	will	be	published	by
Palgrave	in	early	2018.
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